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Abstract: This paper proposes a chi-square method (CSM) to obtain a priority vector for group 11 
decision making (GDM) problems where decision-makers’(DMs’) assessment on alternative is 12 
furnished as incomplete reciprocal preference relations with missing values. Relevant theorems 13 
and iterative algorithm about CSM are proposed. Satty’s consistency ratio concept is adapted to 14 
judge whether an incomplete reciprocal preference relation provided by a DM is of acceptable 15 
consistency. If its consistency is unacceptable, an algorithm is proposed to repair it until its 16 
consistency ratio reaches a satisfactory threshold. The repairing algorithm aims to rectify an 17 
inconsistent incomplete reciprocal preference relation to one with acceptable consistency in 18 
addition to preserving the initial preference information as much as possible. Finally, four 19 
examples are examined to illustrate the applicability and validity of the proposed method, and 20 
comparative analyses are provided to show its advantages over existing approaches. 21 
 22 
Keywords: Group decision making; chi-square method; incomplete reciprocal preference relation; 23 
priority; consistency. 24 
1. Introduction 25 
Group decision making (GDM) [9, 13, 14, 18, 21, 24, 35] is a procedure of 26 
drawing on the combined wisdom and experience of experts from different domains 27 
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to rank a finite number of alternatives. Reciprocal preference relations [21, 23, 27, 34, 28 
39] are commonly used to represent decision-makers (DMs)’ preferences over a set of 29 
possible alternative solutions, and have received considerable research attention in the 30 
past decades. However, owing to time pressure, lack of knowledge, and the DM’s 31 
limited expertise in the specific problem domain [1, 4, 5, 33, 36, 37, 41-44], 32 
sometimes a DM can at best furnish his/her judgment on alternatives as a reciprocal 33 
preference relation with missing or incomplete entries. Therefore, the method to 34 
derive priorities from incomplete reciprocal preference relations [3, 10, 11, 15, 41] 35 
has presented itself as an important and promising research topic, and attracted 36 
considerable research interest.  37 
For example, Xu and Da [32] put forward a normalizing ranking aggregation 38 
method (NRAM) to derive priorities from an incomplete reciprocal preference 39 
relation. Xu and Wang [40] extended the well-known eigenvector method (EM) for 40 
priority derivation for an incomplete reciprocal preference relation, and the 41 
improvement method therein not only increases the consistency level but also 42 
preserves the initial preference information as much as possible. It is worth noting that 43 
the aforementioned NRAM and EM can only be applied to a single incomplete 44 
reciprocal preference relation. Xu [41] proposed two goal programming models 45 
(GPM) to obtain a collective priority vector from several incomplete reciprocal 46 
preference relations. Gong [17] put forward a least-square method (LSM) to generate 47 
a collective priority vector from incomplete reciprocal preference relations furnished 48 
by multiple DMs. Gong’s approach results in a simple equation. But it cannot be 49 
applied to obtain a priority vector when the matrix Q is singular or Q-1 does not exist. 50 
In contrast to LSM, which is only applicable to the case with at least one 51 
multiplicative inconsistent incomplete reciprocal preference relation, the logarithmic 52 
least squares method (LLSM) put forward by Xu et al. [38] can be used for all 53 
incomplete reciprocal preference relations regardless of their multiplicative 54 
consistency property. In real-world decision processes, different DMs often carry 55 
heterogeneous power in reaching the final recommendation. It is noted that the 56 
aforementioned methods did not take into account DMs’ weights in the decision 57 
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process.  58 
This paper extends a chi-square method (CSM) to prioritize alternatives in a GDM 59 
context when DMs furnish their judgment as incomplete reciprocal preference 60 
relations. The CSM was initially developed for priorities by Jensen [19]，and was later 61 
cited by Blankmeyer [7]. The original approach is complicated and has rarely been 62 
used. Wang and Fu [28] developed a convergent and simple iterative algorithm to 63 
facilitate its application in practice. Due to its nonlinear property, this improved 64 
algorithm has many advantages such as ease in computer implementation. As such, 65 
the extended CSM has arisen as a simple but efficient approach to deal with 66 
incomplete reciprocal preference relations. 67 
The key motivations to adopt the CSM can be summarized as follows: (1) The 68 
CSM can be used to obtain a collective priority vector from several incomplete 69 
reciprocal preference relations, while other methods such as EM and NRAM can only 70 
be applied to a single incomplete reciprocal preference relation. This advantage makes 71 
it a natural choice for handling GDM. (2) The CSM is convenient in considering 72 
different DMs’ weights in the decision process while this issue has been largely 73 
omitted by other methods. (3) By properly setting model parameters, the CSM can be 74 
flexibly employed to handle both complete and incomplete reciprocal preference 75 
relations. (4) Compared with other methods, the CSM is known for its better fitting 76 
performance, rank preservation capability and discrimination power. After Wang and 77 
Fu [28]’s extension, the improved CSM has become an efficient and convenient tool 78 
to handle incomplete reciprocal preference relations. By exploiting CSM to derive 79 
priority weights from incomplete reciprocal preference relations in a GDM context, 80 
this article further enhances its applications and enriches the theory and methodology 81 
of priority derivation. 82 
An important issue in GDM with incomplete reciprocal preference relations is 83 
consistency test and inconsistency repairing because consistency of the judgment 84 
given by DMs has a direct impact on the final decision result [22]. Xu and Wang [40] 85 
adapted Saaty [26]’s consistency ratio (CR) to a fuzzy context and introduced a 86 
so-called fuzzy consistency ratio (FCR), which can be applied to incomplete 87 
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reciprocal preference relations. By adopting Saaty’s suggested threshold, an 88 
incomplete reciprocal preference relation is deemed to be acceptably consistent if 89 
FCR<0.1 [24]. If an incomplete reciprocal preference relation given by the DM does 90 
not possess acceptable consistency, it has to be repaired so that its consistency reaches 91 
the acceptable threshold. This paper will put forward a CSM-based algorithm to 92 
accomplish this task.  93 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review on 94 
basic concepts of reciprocal preference relations, incomplete reciprocal preference 95 
relations and an acceptable FCR. An associated theorem is also presented. In Section 96 
3, the CSM is extended to obtain a priority vector from incomplete reciprocal 97 
preference relations based on the multiplicative transitivity property, resulting in an 98 
iterative algorithm. Section 4 puts forward an approach to repair an unacceptably 99 
inconsistent incomplete reciprocal preference relation to derive one with acceptable 100 
consistency. In Section 5, four examples are examined to show how to apply the 101 
proposed CSM and its effectiveness in handling GDM problems. Comparative 102 
analyses with existing methods demonstrate its validity and advantages. Concluding 103 
remarks are furnished in Section 6. 104 
2. Preliminaries 105 
In this section, we will give the definitions of reciprocal preference relations, 106 
incomplete reciprocal preference relations and a FCR.  107 
Denote {1,2, , }N n  , {1, 2, , }M m  . Let 1 2{ , , , }nX x x x   ( 2)n   be a 108 
finite set of alternatives, where ix  denotes the ith alternative. 1{ , , }mE e e   be a 109 
finite set of experts, where ke  stands for the kth expert. 1( , , )TmH h h    be the 110 
weight vector of experts, where 1 1
m
kk
h  , 0kh   and kh  demonstrates the 111 
importance degree of expert ke  in the decision process. 112 
A fuzzy preference relation is defined as follows [9, 16, 44]. The preference 113 
information on X  is described by a fuzzy preference relation R X X  , 114 
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( )ij n nR r  , with membership function : [0,1]R X X   , where ( , )R i j ijx x r   115 
denotes the preference degree of alternative ix  over jx . 0.5ijr   indicates the 116 
DM’s indifference between ix  and jx . 1ijr   signifies that ix  is definitely 117 
preferred to jx . 0 0.5ijr   implies that jx  is preferred to ix  and the smaller ijr  118 
the stronger the preference of alternative jx  over ix . 0.5 1ijr   means that ix  is 119 
preferred to jx  and the greater ijr  the stronger the preference of alternative ix  over 120 
jx . 121 
 122 
Definition 1 [21]. Let ( )ij n nR r   be a fuzzy preference relation, then R is called a 123 
reciprocal preference relation if 124 
[0,1]ijr  , 1ij jir r  , 0.5iir  , for all ,i j N .                                         125 
Definition 2 [12, 27]. Let ( )ij n nR r  be a reciprocal preference relation, then R has 126 
multiplicative transitivity property if 127 
1 1 11 1 = 1
ij jk ikr r r
          
, , ,i j k N . 128 
It has been found [17] that a perfectly multiplicative transitivity reciprocal 129 
preference relation ( )ij n nR r   can be precisely characterized by a priority vector 130 
1 2( , , , )TnW w w w  , where / ( )ij i i jr w w w  , 1 1
n
ii
w   and 0iw   for 131 
1, 2, ,i n  . 132 
Definition 3 [2]. A membership function f : X → Y is called partial if at least one 133 
element in the set X is not mapped to an element in the set Y. If every element from 134 
the set X is mapped to an element in Y, then we have a total function. 135 
Definition 4 [2]. A reciprocal preference relation P on a set of alternatives X with a 136 
partial membership function is an incomplete reciprocal preference relation. 137 
For any ,i j N , let ijc  be the ijth entry of an incomplete preference relation 138 
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( )ij n nC c  , 
1
0
ij
ij
ij
c
c
     
, and ijc    indicates a missing element ijc . 139 
According to Definition 3, 1ij   if and only if there exists ( , )ij C i jc x x , 0ij   140 
denotes that the preference value ( , )ij C i jc x x  is not furnished or missing. 141 
Theorem 1 [20]. Let ( )ij n nC c   be an incomplete reciprocal preference relation, 142 
Then C can be completed by the known elements if there exists at least one known 143 
non-diagonal element in each row or column of C. This implies that an incomplete 144 
reciprocal preference relation C which can be completed has at least (n-1) 145 
non-diagonal judgments. 146 
Let ( )ij n nC c   be an incomplete reciprocal preference relation, its fuzzy 147 
consistency index and fuzzy consistency ratio are denoted by FCI and FCR for short, 148 
and their formulas are presented as follows [38]. 149 
1
1= 2( 1)
ij j ji i
ij ij
i j n ji i ij j
c w c wFCI
n n c w c w
FCIFCR
RI
 
  
          

  (1) 150 
where ij  and ij  are binary variables defined below and RI is the mean 151 
consistency index of randomly generated multiplicative preference matrices as given 152 
in Table 1. 153 
0, if 0 or 1,
1, otherwise.
ij
ij
c   , ,i j N .                                (2) 154 
0, if ,
1, if ,
ij
ij
ij
c
c
     
, ,i j N .                                     (3) 155 
By adapting the acceptable consistency threshold 0.1 proposed by Saaty, we have 156 
Definition 5 [38]. Let ( )ij n nC c   be an incomplete reciprocal preference relation, if 157 
FCR<0.1, then C is of acceptable consistency, otherwise C’s consistency level is 158 
unacceptable. 159 
Table 1. The mean consistency index of randomly generated matrix [26] 160 
n 1 2 3   4    5  6  7    8 9  10   11   12 13  14  15 
RI 0 0  0.52  0.89  1.12  1.26 1.36  1.41  1.46 1.49  1.52  1.54  1.56  1.58 1.59 
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3. A chi-square method for priority derivation from group incomplete 161 
reciprocal preference relations 162 
Consider a GDM problem, where m DMs give their preferences in the form of 163 
reciprocal preference relations, i.e. expert ke  describes his/her preference 164 
information as ( ) ( )( )k kij n nR r  . 165 
Let 1 2( , , , )TnW w w w   be the priority weight vector for the reciprocal 166 
preference relations ( ) ( )( )k kij n nR r  , where 1 1
n
ii
w  , 0iw  , i N . If 167 
( ) ( )( )k kij n nR r   is a complete reciprocal preference relation with multiplicative 168 
transitivity then it can be expessed as [17] 169 
( )k i
ij
i j
wr
w w
  , 
,i j N .                                         (4) 170 
If some elements of ( )kR  are missing or not given by the DM, then ( )kR  is an 171 
incomplete reciprocal preference relation. We shall extend Eq. (4) to the case of 172 
incomplete reciprocal preference relations. For computational convenience, an 173 
indicator matrix ( )ij n n    is constructed for incomplete reciprocal preference 174 
relation ( ) ( )( )k kij n nC c   as follows  175 
( ) ( ) ( )k k k i
ij ij ij
i j
wc
w w
   , 
,i j N .                                         (5) 176 
where ( )kij  is a binary variable defined as [41]: 177 
( )
( )
( )
,0,
.1,
k
ijk
ij k
ij
c
c
                                                    (6) 178 
Due to additive reciprocity, it is easy to find that ( ) ( )k kij ji  .  179 
Next, we turn to find a priority vector 1 2( , , )TnW w w w   to satisfy Eq.(5), 180 
where 1 1, 0
n
i ii
w w   . To accomplish this, the following chi-square optimization 181 
model is constructed: 182 
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   
2( )
( )
1 1 1
/ ( )
/ ( )
km n n
ij i i jk
k ij
k i j i i j
c w w w
Min F W h
w w w

  
      
  (7) 183 
s. t.  1 1,
0, .
n
i
i
i
w
w i N

   
                                            (8) 184 
1 2
1
( , , , ) 1, 0,
n
T
W n i i
i
D W w w w w w i N

         .             (9) 185 
The idea is to minimize the overall deviation from Eq. (5). To solve this 186 
chi-square model, the following theorem is established. 187 
Theorem 2. F(W) has a unique minimum point 1 2( , , )Tn wW w w w D   , which is 188 
also the unique solution of the following system of equations in WD : 189 
( ) 2( ) ( ) 2( )
1 1 1 1
n m n m
jk k k ki
k ji ji k ij ij
j k j kj i
wwh c h c
w w
 
   
  . (10) 190 
Proof. As WD  is a bounded vector space and ( )F W  is continuous function in WD , 191 
for ( ) 0F W  , ww D , ( )F W  therefore has an infimum, namely there exists 192 
ww D  such that function ( )F W  reaches its minimum value. 193 
In order to obtain the optimal priority vector 1 2( , , )Tn wW w w w D   , the 194 
following Lagrangian function is constructed. 195 
1
( , ) ( ) 1
n
i
i
L W F W w 

      .                                  (11) 196 
where   is the Lagrange multiplier. By setting the partial derivatives with respect to 197 
iw  to be zero, we obtain the following set of equations: 198 
     2( ) 2( ) ( ) ( )2
1 1 1 1
1 0( )
n m n m
k k j jk k k ki
k ji ji ij ij k ij ji
j k j ki j i i j
w wwh c c h
w w w w w
    
   
           , 199 
i N                                            (12)                200 
Given that ( ) ( )k kij ji  , Eq. (12) can be further simplified as follows 201 
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( ) 2( ) ( ) 2( )
1 1
1 0
n m
jk k k ki
k ji ji ij ij
j ki j i
wwh c c
w w w
  
 
       , i N                  (13) 202 
which is equivalent to 203 
( ) 2( ) ( ) 2( )
1 1
0
n m
jk k k ki
k ji ji ij ij i
j k j i
wwh c c w
w w
  
 
       , i N                  (14) 204 
Summing up Eq. (14) with respect to iw , i N , we have  205 
( ) 2( ) ( ) 2( )
1 1 1 1
0
n n m n
jk k k ki
k ji ji ij ij i
i j k ij i
wwh c c w
w w
  
   
                          (15) 206 
Since ( ) 2( ) ( ) 2( )1 1 1 0
n n m jk k k ki
k ji ji ij iji j k
j i
wwh c c
w w
   
         and 1 1
n
ii
w  , we have 207 
 =0. Plugging  =0 into Eq. (14), one has 208 
( ) 2( ) ( ) 2( )
1 1
0
n m
jk k k ki
k ji ji ij ij
j k j i
wwh c c
w w
 
 
      , i N             (16) 209 
That is 210 
( ) 2( ) ( ) 2( )
1 1 1 1
n m n m
jk k k ki
k ji ji k ij ij
j k j kj i
wwh c h c
w w
 
   
  , i N      (17) 211 
It is clear that the minimum point W   is a solution to Eq. (10), if the solution is 212 
unique in wD , W   can be uniquely determined. The uniqueness is proved by 213 
contradiction as follows. 214 
Assume that 1 2( , , , )Tn wV v v v D   and 1 2( , , , )Tn wW w w w D  are two 215 
solutions to Eq. (10). Let /i i iu w v , i N  and max { }l i N iu u . If there exists 216 
j N  such that j lu u , then we have 217 
( ) 2( ) ( ) 2( ) ( ) 2( )
1 1 1 1 1 1
n m n m n m
j j j jk k k k k k
k lj lj k lj lj k lj lj
j k j k j kl l l l
v v u w
h c h c h c
v v u w
  
     
      (18) 218 
( ) 2( ) ( ) 2( ) ( ) 2( )
1 1 1 1 1 1
n m n m n m
k k k k k kl l l l
k jl jl k jl jl k jl jl
j k j k j kj j j j
v v u wh c h c h c
v v u w
  
     
      (19) 219 
According to Eqs. (10), (18), (19), it can be deduced that 220 
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( ) 2( ) ( ) 2( )
1 1 1 1
n m n m
jk k k k l
k lj lj k jl jl
j k j kl j
w wh c h c
w w
 
   
   (20) 221 
which contradicts Eq. (10), Thus, j lu u  cannot hold. Therefore, for all j N , 222 
j lu u , namely, 1 1 2 2/ / ... /n nw v w v w v   . Due to the fact that 1 1
n
ii
v  , 223 
1 1
n
ii
w  , we have i iw v , i N  . This proves the uniqueness of the solution to 224 
Eq. (10). 225 
To solve Eq.(10), we put forward a simple convergent iterative algorithm as 226 
follows. 227 
Algorithm 1. 228 
Let ( )( )kk ij n nC c   ( k M ) be the initial incomplete reciprocal preference 229 
relations provided by the DMs.  230 
Step 1. Using Theorem 1 to judge whether an incomplete reciprocal preference 231 
relation ( )kC k M  given by the DM ke  can be completed. If not, it is 232 
returned to expert ke  for an updated reciprocal preference relation, 233 
otherwise, go to Step 2. 234 
Step 2. Initiating the iteration by giving an initial priority vector (0)W 235 
 1 2(0), (0), , (0) Tnw w w  and specifying an error parameter   ( 0 1  ), 236 
for example, 0.0001  , and setting L=0. 237 
Step 3. Calculating 238 
  ( ) 2( ) ( ) 2( )
1 1 1 1
( )
n m n m
jk k k ki
i k ji ji k ij ij
j k j kj i
wwW L h c h c
w w
  
   
   , i N             (21) 239 
If  ( )i W L   holds for all i N , then ( )W W L   and stop, otherwise, 240 
continue to Step 4. 241 
Step 4. Determining p such that    ( ) max ( )p i N iW L W L   and computing 242 
11 
 
   
( ) 2( )
1, 1
2
1, 1
( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
n m jk k
k pj pjj j p k
p
n m k k p
k jp jpj j p k
j
w L
h c
w L
T L w L
h c
w L


  
  

 
 
 (22) 243 
( ) ( ), ,( ) ( ), ,
p
i
i
T L w L i p
f L
w L i p
  
                                     (23) 244 
i=1( 1) ( ) ( )
n
i i iw L f L f L   , i N .                               (24) 245 
Step 5. Let 1L L   and go to Step 3. 246 
For Algorithm 1, we can establish the following theorem. 247 
Theorem 3. Algorithm 1 is convergent for any 0  . 248 
Proof. We shall examine how F(W) changes, when W(L) progresses to W(L+1). 249 
Suppose that 0t   and 1 1 1( ) ( ( )) ( ( ),..., ( ), ( ), ( ),...,p p pS t F f L F w L w L tw L w L  250 
( ))nw L .  251 
Then we have 252 
   
 
2
( ) ( )
1, 1
( )( ) ( ) ( )
n m
p p jk k
k pj pj
j j p k p j p
tw L tw L w L
S t h c
tw L w L tw L

  
          
 253 
2
( ) ( )
1, 1
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
n m
i pk k i
k ip ip
i i p k i p i
w L tw Lw Lh c
w L tw L w L

  
          
   254 
2
( ) ( )
1, 1, 1
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
n n m
i jk k i
k ij ij
i i p j j p k i j i
w L w Lw Lh c
w L w L w L

    
          
    (25) 255 
which is equivalent to  256 
    2( ) ( ) 2( )1, 1 1, 1
( ) 1( ) ( )
n m n m
k j pk k k
k pj pj k jp jp
j j p k j j p kp j
w L w L
S t h c h c t
w L t w L
 
     
        257 
 ( ) 2( ) ( ) 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1, 1
2
n m
k k k k k k k k
k jp jp pj pj jp jp pj pj
j j p k
h c c c c   
  
      
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   
1, 1
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
n m
k p k j
k jp pj
j j p k p j p j
tw L w L
h
tw L w L tw L w L
 
  
         259 
   
2
1, 1, 1
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
n n m
k k i ji
k ij ij
i i p j j p k i j i
w L w Lw Lh c
w L w L w L

    
          
    (26) 260 
Let 261 
( ) 2( )
1
1, 1
( )
( )
n m
jk k
k pj pj
j j p k p
w L
q h c
w L

  
   ,                                   (27) 262 
   2
2
1, 1
( )
( )
n m
k k p
k jp jp
j j p k j
w L
q h c
w L

  
   ,                                   (28) 263 
 ( ) 2( ) ( ) 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3
1, 1
2
n m
k k k k k k k k
k jp jp pj pj jp jp pj pj
j j p k
q h c c c c   
  
        264 
( ) ( )
1, 1
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
n m
p jk k
k jp pj
j j p k p j p j
tw L w L
h
tw L w L tw L w L
 
  
         265 
2
( ) ( )
1, 1, 1
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
n n m
i jk k i
k ij ij
i i p j j p k i j i
w L w Lw Lh c
w L w L w L

    
          
     
      
(29) 266 
Since ( ) ( )k kij ji  , the second double summation term in Eq. (29) can be rewritten 267 
as 268 
( ) ( )
1, 1
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
n m
p jk k
k jp pj
j j p k p j p j
tw L w L
h
tw L w L tw L w L
 
  
        269 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( 1) if 1
0 if 0
k k
jp pj
k k
jp pj
n  
 
        
                                     (30) 270 
Therefore, 3q  can be further simplified as 271 
 ( ) 2( ) ( ) 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )3
1, 1
2
n m
k k k k k k k k
k jp jp pj pj jp jp pj pj
j j p k
q h c c c c   
  
        272 
   
2
1, 1, 1
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
n n m
k k i ji
k ij ij
i i p j j p k i j i
w L w Lw Lh c
w L w L w L

    
          
  
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   
   
( 1) if 1,
0 if 0,
k k
jp pj
k k
jp pj
n  
 
      
                                     (31)
 
274 
This indicates that 3q  is independent of t . Then Eq. (26) can be equivalently275 
expressed as 276 
1 2 3( ) /S t q t q t q    .                                          (32) 277 
By setting ( )dS t
dt
 to be zero, we have 278 
( ) 2( )
1, 1
1 2
( ) 2( )
1, 1
( )
( )
( )
( )
n m
jk k
k pj pj
j j p k p
n m
pk k
k jp jp
j j p k j
w L
h c
w L
t q q w L
h c
w L


  
  
 
 
 
, (33) 279 
1 2 3( ) 2S t q q q   ,                                            (34) 280 
where t  stands for the minimum point, and ( )S t  gives the minimum value of 281 
( )S t . 282 
If t =1, Eq. (33) is equivalent to 283 
( ) 2( ) ( ) 2( )
1, 1 1, 1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
n m n m
j pk k k k
k pj pj k jp jp
j j p k j j p kp j
w L w L
h c h c
w L w L
 
     
    . (35) 284 
which also holds for j p , therefore, we have 285 
( ) 2( ) ( ) 2( )
1 1 1 1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
n m n m
j pk k k k
k pj pj k jp jp
j k j kp j
w L w L
h c h c
w L w L
 
   
  . (36) 286 
That is 287 
         2 2
1 1 1 1
( ) ( )( ) 0( ) ( )
n m n m
k k p k k j
p k jp jp k pj pj
j k j kj p
w L w L
W L h c h c
w L w L
  
   
    .
 
288 
By the definition of p in Step 3, we have  ( ) 0p W L  . Since p is the subscript 289 
such that  ( )i W L  is maximized, we thus have  ( ) 0i W L   for all i N . 290 
Therefore, the algorithm terminates and ( )W W L  . 291 
If 1t   , then  292 
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     21 2 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) (1) ( ) 2 0F W L F f L S S t q q q q q q          (37) 293 
Since ( )F W is a homogenous function,    ( ) ( 1)F f L F W L  . Inequality (37)294 
shows that    ( 1) ( )F W L F W L  , for any 0L  . Therefore,  ( )F W L  is a 295 
monotonically decreasing sequence with an infimum in wD  and, hence, convergent. 296 
4. A method for repairing inconsistency of incomplete reciprocal preference 297 
relations 298 
If the consistency level of an incomplete reciprocal preference relation is too low 299 
and deemed unacceptable, it can be returned to the DM for a reassessment until the 300 
updated one reaches an acceptable consistency level. This approach is presumably 301 
more reliable and accurate, but it is often impracticable because the iteration process 302 
can be tedious and time-consuming. To facilitate the decision process, this section 303 
puts forwards an automated procedure to improve the consistency level of a given 304 
incomplete reciprocal preference relation with unacceptable consistency 0.1FCR  . 305 
Whenever possible, the DM’s intervention should be called upon, but this procedure 306 
serves as a convenient tool and can be employed by the analyst to facilitate the DM in 307 
eliciting his/her preference expeditiously. We first introduce the consistency deviation 308 
variable for ijc  as follows. 309 
| / ( ) |ij ij i i jd c w w w                                            (38) 310 
If 0ijd  , for all ,i j N  and ijc   , then C is a perfectly consistent 311 
incomplete reciprocal preference relation. The priority vector W is able to precisely 312 
represent C. The higher the deviation ijd , the more likely ijc  should be updated.  313 
Conceptually, a judgment ijc  should be as close to / ( )i i jw w w  as possible to 314 
make it more consistent. In addition, the known element ijc  given by the expert 315 
often falls in the set  0,0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9,1U  . To avoid 316 
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excessive distortion of the DM’s original judgment, the improved preference relation 317 
should not only increase the consistency level but also try to preserve the initial 318 
preference information. The procedure starts with identifying the unusual and false 319 
elements (UFEs) that are the most inconsistent element with the biggest ijd . Once the 320 
UFEs are identified, the initial UFE ( ijc ) will be updated with ijc , where 321 
1( / ( ) 10) 10ij i i jc round w w w       and “round” is the usual round operation. This 322 
function ensures the updated judgment values are between 0 and 1 and have one 323 
decimal place. It is trivial to make adjustment to accommodate the case when the 324 
analyst or DM prefers to express the judgment in more decimal places. 325 
Given the aforesaid discussion, the following algorithm is devised to repair 326 
inconsistency of an incomplete reciprocal preference relation. 327 
Algorithm 2  328 
Let ( )ij n nC c   be an incomplete reciprocal preference relation given by the DM. 329 
Step 1. Using the CSM algorithm in Section 3 to obtain the priority vector 330 
1 2( , , )TnW w w w  . 331 
Step 2. Determining the consistency ratio of the incomplete reciprocal preference 332 
relation as per Eq. (1), if FCR<0.1, go to Step 5, otherwise, go to Step 3. 333 
Step 3. Computing deviations ijd ’s by using Eq. (38), and identifying the 334 
maximum deviation to find the corresponding UFEs. 335 
Step 4. Updating the UFEs ( ijc ) with ijc , where ( / ( ) 10)ij i i jc round w w w     336 
110 , and go to Step 1. 337 
Step 5. Ranking the alternatives according the priority vector W  .  338 
Step 6. End. 339 
5. Illustrative examples 340 
In this section, four numerical examples are examined to demonstrate the 341 
applications and advantages of the proposed CSM framework. Example 1 is a GDM 342 
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problem with incomplete reciprocal preference relations and a comparative analysis 343 
is conducted between CSM and three existing methods. Example 2 is a single 344 
incomplete reciprocal preference relation with unacceptable consistency and 345 
Algorithm 2 is utilized to repair it until its consistency becomes acceptable. Example 346 
3 considers a single incomplete reciprocal preference relation with acceptable 347 
consistency. The purpose is to compare the result derived from CSM with those from 348 
EM, NRAM, GPM, LSM and LLSM on three performance evaluation criteria: FCR, 349 
MAD and MD. Example 4 discusses a GDM problem with incomplete reciprocal 350 
preference relations with a purpose to show the advantages of CSM. 351 
Example 1. For a GDM problem with four decision alternatives ix  ( 1, 2,3, 4i  ) and 352 
three DMs ke  (k =1, 2, 3). The DMs provide their preferences over the four decision 353 
alternatives as three incomplete reciprocal preference relations [41]. 354 
1
0.5 0.6 0.7
0.4 0.5 0.2 0.8
0.8 0.5 0.4
0.3 0.2 0.6 0.5
C
       
, 2
0.5 0.8 0.4
0.2 0.5 0.3 0.6
0.6 0.7 0.5 0.3
0.4 0.7 0.5
C
       
, 3
0.5 0.3 0.4 0.6
0.7 0.5 0.5
0.6 0.5 0.7
0.4 0.5 0.3 0.5
C
       
. 355 
    Xu [41] employed goal programming (GP) models to derive a priority vector  356 
(0.265,0.236,0.276,0.223)TW    from the aforesaid three incomplete reciprocal 357 
preference relations. The research leads to a final ranking: 3 1 2 4x x x x   , which is 358 
the same as the ranking generated by the logarithmic least square method (LLSM) [38] 359 
but slightly differs from the one obtained by the least-square method (LSM) [17] with 360 
the order between 2x  and 4x  being reversed. We now examine the problem using 361 
the CSM. In order to offer a fair comparison with Xu [41]’s method, we also set 1h =362 
2h = 3h =1/3. 363 
Step 1. According to Theorem 1, we know that kC  (k =1, 2, 3) can all be 364 
completed by known elements. 365 
Step 2. Given an initial priority vector (0) (0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25)TW  , specify the 366 
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parameter  =0.1, and let L=0. 367 
Step 3. Calculate  (0)i W , we have  368 
 1 (0) 0.2W   ,  2 (0) 0.2W   , 369 
 3 (0) 0.4W   ,  4 (0) 0.4W   . 370 
As  (0)i W   holds for all 1, 2, 3, 4i  , we continue to Step 4. 371 
Step 4. Determine p such that    ( ) max ( )p i N iW L W L  , we can set 372 
3p  , and compute (0)T , (0)f  and (1)W . 373 
(0) 1.3650T  , (0) (0.2500,0.2500,0.3413,0.2500)Tf  , 374 
(1) (0.2291,0.2291,0.3127,0.2291)TW  . 375 
Step 5. Let 1 1L L    and go to Step 3. 376 
The computation processes are detailed in Table 2. It is clear that iterations 377 
terminates at 3L , when 1| | 0.0296 0.1   , 2| | 0.0072 0.1   , 3| | 0.0227 0.1   , 378 
4
4| | 2.6357 10 0.1    , indicating that the derived priority vector has reached an 379 
acceptable level of  . The optimal priority vector is thus found to be W  380 
(0.2797,0.2197,0.3,0.2007)T , resulting in a ranking of the four alternatives 381 
3 1 2 4x x x x   .  382 
Remark 1. Computation results in Table 2 demonstrate that F(W(L)) decreases in 383 
iteration step L. However, for ( ( ))i W L , this monotonicity does not hold any more 384 
and there may have ups and downs when L increases, but eventually ( ( ))i W L   385 
will decrease to a value below the threshold   as ascertained by Theorem 3. As three 386 
of the four aforesaid methods derive an identical ranking with the other one yielding a 387 
slightly different order, this result demonstrates the robustness and credibility of the 388 
proposed CSM framework. To further compare the performance with the other three 389 
methods in fitting the three incomplete reciprocal preference relations, the following 390 
evaluation criteria are introduced: 391 
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Maximum deviation (MD) for incomplete reciprocal preference relations 392 
( )
, ,
MD max 2 , ,ij j jik iiji j k
ji i ij j
c w c w i j N k M
c w c w
             
 (39) 393 
Maximum absolute deviation (MAD) for incomplete reciprocal preference 394 
relations 395 
( ) ( )
, ,
MAD max , ,k k iij iji j k
i j
wc i j N k M
w w
        
. (40) 396 
where ( )kij  is defined by Eq. (6). ( ) ( ) / ( )k kij ij i i jd c w w w    is the consistency 397 
deviation for ( )kijc  in the incomplete reciprocal preference relation ( ) ( )( )k kij n nC c  . If 398 
the priority vector 1( , )TnW w w   is able to precisely characterize the reciprocal 399 
preference relation ( )kC , then ( ) 0kijd  , otherwise, ( ) 0kijd  . 400 
Table 3 indicates that CSM results in an identical ranking as GPM and LLSM 401 
while the ranking derived by LSM is slightly different. CSM has a comparable MAD 402 
as GPM, which is smaller than both LSM and LLSM. In terms of MD, CSM 403 
outperforms all the other three methods as it yields the smallest deviation. This partly 404 
shows the advantage of the CSM. 405 
Remark 2. To facilitate a comparative study with GPM, LSM and LLSM, the weights 406 
of three reciprocal preference relations were set to be equal ( 1h = 2h = 3h =1/3). 407 
However, CSM allows an analyst to set different weights as per the practical situation, 408 
to properly reflect different experts’ varying influences in the GDM problem at hand. 409 
It is worth noting that if ij =1, for all ,i j N , then the proposed CSM can still be 410 
utilized to derive a priority vector from reciprocal preference relations. This means 411 
that CSM can be used for both complete and incomplete reciprocal preference 412 
relations. In addition, by setting 1h =1 and kh =0, for 2, ,k m  , the CSM can be 413 
conveniently applied to derive a priority vector from a single incomplete reciprocal 414 
preference relation. This allows CSM to be used for a single expert's decision making 415 
problems in Examples 2 and 3. 416 
19 
 
Furthermore, by using Algorithm 1, we can get the values of L, W, F(W) and the 417 
ranking of alternatives for different  ’s as listed in Table 4. 418 
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Table 2 
The iterative processes for Example 1.  
 
Table 3 
Performance comparisons for Example 1. 
Methods W* Ranking MD MAD 
CSM (this article) (0.2797, 0.2197, 0.3000, 0.2007)T x3 φ x1 φ x2 φ x4 1.9277 0.2992 
LSM [17] (0.2822, 0.1968, 0.3202, 0.2009)T x3 φ x1 φ x4 φ x2 2.3282 0.3145 
GPM [41] (0.265, 0.236, 0.276, 0.223)T x3 φ x1 φ x2 φ x4 2.0442 0.2858 
LLSM [38] (0.2806, 0.2105, 0.3189, 0.1900)T x3 φ x1 φ x2 φ x4 2.1717 0.3266 
 
Table 4 
The values of L, W, F(W) and ranking order for different ε in Example 1. 
ε L W Ranking  F(W) |η1| |η2| |η3| |η4|
10-1 3 (0.2797, 0.2197, 0.3000, 0.2007)T x3 φ x1 φ x2 φ x4 0.6024 0.0001 0.0728 0.0868 0.0141 
10-2 15 (0.2753, 0.2204, 0.3032, 0.2011)T x3 φ x1 φ x2 φ x4 0.6020 0.0031 0 0.0083 0.0052 
10-3 24 (0.2746, 0.2201, 0.3041, 0.2012)T x3 φ x1 φ x2 φ x4 0.6019 3.6858×10-4 0 9.8063×10-4 6.1205×10-4 
10-4 34 (0.2745, 0.2201, 0.3043, 0.2012)T x3 φ x1 φ x2 φ x4 0.6019 5.9215×10-5 2.6310×10-5 8.5525×10-5 0 
10-5 44 (0.2746, 0.2201, 0.3041, 0.2012)T x3 φ x1 φ x2 φ x4 0.6019 1.1102×10-16 6.4088×10-6 8.2368×10-6 1.8281×10-6 
10-6 53 (0.2746, 0.2201, 0.3041, 0.2012)T x3 φ x1 φ x2 φ x4 0.6019 1.1102×10-16 6.4088×10-6 8.2368×10-6 1.8281×10-6 
 
Iterative steps |ηi(W(L))| W(L) F(W) 
L |η1| |η2| |η3| |η4| w1 w2 w3 w4  
0 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.7067 
1 0.3031 0.0835 1.156×10-4 0.2197 0.2291 0.2291 0.3127 0.2291 0.6449 
2 6.197×10-5 0.0571 0.0792 0.1362 0.2744 0.2256 0.2943 0.2156 0.6086 
3 0.0296 0.0072 0.0227 2.6357×10-4 0.2797 0.2197 0.3000 0.2007 0.6024 
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Example 2. Consider a single DM’s decision problem with six alternatives ix  404 
( 1,2, ,6i   ). The DM provides his/her preferences over the six decision alternatives, 405 
as an incomplete reciprocal preference relation which is shown below (adapted from 406 
[42] ). 407 
0.5 0.3 0.8 0.3
0.5
0.5
0.7 0.5 0.4 0.8
0.2 0.6 0.5 0.7
0.7 0.2 0.3 0.5
C
                      
 408 
Step 1. According to Theorem 1, it is easy to tell that C can be completed as no 409 
non-diagonal elements are furnished in the second or third row (column) of C. 410 
Therefore, the initial judgment matrix has to be returned to the DM for an update, 411 
resulting in the following incomplete reciprocal preference relation: 412 
       
0.5 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.3
0.7 0.5 0.7 0.6
0.3 0.5 0.4
0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.8
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.7
0.7 0.2 0.3 0.5
C
              
 413 
Without loss of generality, let the original weight vector be (0) (1 / 6,1 / 6,1 / 6,W   414 
1/ 6,1/ 6,1/ 6)T . Using Algorithm 1, one can get the values of L, W, F(W), FCR, 415 
|ηi(W(L))| and ranking results by setting different   values as listed in Table 5. When 416 
  is sufficiently small, the weight vector approaches  417 
(0.1301, 0.2714, 0.1281, 0.2090, 0.1509, 0.1106)TW   , 418 
Step 2. Computing FCR by Eq. (1). 419 
0.1870FCI  , / 0.1870 /1.26 0.1484 0.1FCR FCI RI    . 420 
Since FCR>0.1, the incomplete reciprocal preference relation C does not possess 421 
satisfactory consistency. We need to find its UFEs to repair this preference relation. 422 
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Step 3. Calculating the deviations between original judgment ijc  and its 423 
corresponding consistent representation, we have 424 
0 0.0241 0 0.0837 0.3369 0.2405
0.0241 0 0.0206 0 0.0427 0
0 0.0206 0 0.0201 0 0
0.0837 0 0.0201 0 0.1808 0.1461
0.3369 0.0427 0 0.1808 0 0.1231
0.2405 0 0 0.1461 0.1231 0
D
          
. 425 
Obviously, the maximum deviations are 15d  and 51d , so the UFEs are 15c  and 51c . 426 
Step 4. Updating the UFEs ijc  with ( / (ij i i jc round w w w   1) 10) 10  , one 427 
has 15c =0.5 and 51c =0.5. 428 
Thus C is updated as 429 
        
0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3
0.7 0.5 0.7 0.6
0.3 0.5 0.4
0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.8
0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.7
0.7 0.2 0.3 0.5
C
               
 430 
Using Algorithm 1, one can obtain the values of L, W, F(W), FCR, |ηi(W(L))| and 431 
ranking of alternatives with different  ’s as listed in Table 6. When   is sufficiently 432 
small, the final priority vector is obtained as 433 
(0.0994,0.2699,0.1275,0.2083,0.1889,0.1061)TW    434 
Computing FCR by Eq. (1). 435 
0.0661FCI  , / 0.0661/1.26 0.0525 0.1FCR FCI RI    . 436 
Thus, this updated C is deemed to have acceptable consistency. 437 
Step 5. Using the final priority vector W* to rank the alternatives as 438 
(0.0994,0.2699,0.1275,0.2083,0.1889,0.1061)TW   . 439 
2 4 5 3 6 1x x x x x x     . 440 
23 
 
By changing only 15c  and 51c , we were able to rectify an incomplete reciprocal 441 
preference relation to derive one with acceptable consistency. This allows the analyst 442 
to avoid the hassle of returning the inconsistent preference relation to the DM for 443 
reconsideration. 444 
Remark 3. Numerical results in Tables 4, 5 and 6 demonstrate that iteration step L 445 
increases when error parameter   decreases. In general, F(W) and the consistency 446 
ratio of an incomplete reciprocal preference relation C gets smaller when   decrease. 447 
When the error parameter   is sufficiently small, W, F(W), FCR, and ranking results 448 
will converge to a set of values and remain unchanged. 449 
In order to show the effectiveness of CSM, the other three methods EM [40], 450 
LSM [17], and LLSM [38] are also applied to the rectified C’ and assessed in terms of 451 
the criteria FCR, MD and MAD. Table 7 lists the ranking results by the four methods. 452 
It is clear that CSM and LLSM yield the same ranking 2 4 5 3 6 1x x x x x x     , 453 
but EM and LSM generate slightly different rankings. Most notably, the EM and LSM 454 
reverse the order of 1x  and 6x , while the DM’s original judgment points to 6 1x x  455 
because '61 61 0.7c c  . It is apparent that this reverse is unwarranted and undesirable. 456 
Moreover, CSM produces the smallest MD and MAD among the four methods, and 457 
the FCR from CSM is marginally larger than that from LLSM, but is smaller than 458 
those derived from EM and LSM. Across the three metrics, FCR, MD and MAD, 459 
Table 7 shows that CSM overall performs better than the other three methods EM, 460 
LSM and LLSM. 461 
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Table 5. The values of L, W, F(W), FCR and rankings for different ε of C in Example 2. 
ε L W Ranking F(W) FCR |ηi(W(L))|
10-1 26 (0.1319, 0.2565, 0.1302, 0.2147, 0.1540, 0.1128)T x2 φ x4 φ x5 φ x1 φ x3 φ x6 1.0276 0.1490 4.4409×10-16, 0.098, 0.0256, 0.0093, 0.0291, 0.034 
10-2 66 (0.1305, 0.2699, 0.1280, 0.2094, 0.1511, 0.1110)T x2 φ x4 φ x5 φ x1 φ x3 φ x6 1.0239 0.1484 0.0041, 0.0095, 1.1102×10
-16, 0.0045, 2.2204×10-16, 
9.3303×10-4 
10-3 107 (0.1301, 0.2712, 0.1281, 0.2090, 0.1509, 0.1107)T x2 φ x4 φ x5 φ x1 φ x3 φ x6 1.0239 0.1484 4.2799×10
-4, 9.7803×10-4, 2.2542×10-4, 
2.2980×10-4, 2.2204×10-16, 9.4821×10-5 
10-4 146 (0.1301, 0.2714, 0.1281, 0.2090, 0.1509, 0.1106)T x2 φ x4 φ x5 φ x1 φ x3 φ x6 1.0239 0.1484 2.2204×10
-16, 9.6242×10-5, 2.2204×10-16, 
3.3698×10-5, 2.8917×10-5, 3.3627×10-5 
10-5 187 (0.1301, 0.2714, 0.1281, 0.2090, 0.1509, 0.1106)T x2 φ x4 φ x5 φ x1 φ x3 φ x6 1.0239 0.1484 2.2204×10
-16, 9.6242×10-5, 2.2204×10-16, 
3.3698×10-5, 2.8917×10-5, 3.3627×10-5 
10-6 227 (0.1301, 0.2714, 0.1281, 0.2090, 0.1509, 0.1106)T x2 φ x4 φ x5 φ x1 φ x3 φ x6 1.0239 0.1484 2.2204×10
-16, 9.6242×10-5, 2.2204×10-16, 
3.3698×10-5, 2.8917×10-5, 3.3627×10-5 
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Table 6. The values of L, W, F(W), FCR and rankings for different ε of C' in Example 2. 
  L W Ranking F(W) FCR |ηi(W(L))|
10-1 22 (0.1014, 0.2551, 0.1288, 0.2126, 0.1914, 0.1108)T x2 φ x4 φ x5 φ x3 φ x 6 φ x1 0.4193 0.0532 0.0143, 0.0943, 0.0127, 0.0406,0, 0.0267 
10-2 61 (0.0994, 0.2685, 0.1278, 0.2086, 0.1892, 0.1064)T x2 φ x4 φ x5 φ x3 φ x 6 φ x1 0.4154 0.0525 2.2204×10
-16, 0.0092, 0.003, 0.003, 
0.0022, 0.001 
10-3 97 (0.0994, 0.2698, 0.1275, 0.2083, 0.1889, 0.1061)T x2 φ x4 φ x5 φ x3 φ x 6 φ x1 0.4154 0.0525 2.2345×10
-4, 8.7826×10-4, 0, 2.2196×10-4, 
1.0941×10-4, 3.2344×10-4 
10-4 133 (0.0994, 0.2699, 0.1275, 0.2083, 0.1889, 0.1061)T x2 φ x4 φ x5 φ x3 φ x 6 φ x1 0.4154 0.0525 2.1921×10
-5, 9.2656×10-5, 1.1102×10-16, 
3.8488×10-5, 2.2204×10-16, 3.2246×10-5 
10-5 170 (0.0994, 0.2699, 0.1275, 0.2082, 0.1889, 0.1061)T x2 φ x4 φ x5 φ x3 φ x 6 φ x1 0.4154 0.0525 2.9494×10
-6, 9.6250×10-6, 1.3882×10-6, 
1.5475×10-6,0, 3.7399×10-6 
10-6 209 (0.0994, 0.2699, 0.1275, 0.2082, 0.1889, 0.1061)T x2 φ x4 φ x5 φ x3 φ x 6 φ x1 0.4154 0.0525 0, 9.2517×10
-7, 2.4979×10-7, 1.9570×10-7, 
3.6807×10-7, 1.1160×10-7 
 
Table 7. Performance comparisons for Example 2. 
Method W  Ranking FCR MD MAD 
CSM (0.0994, 0.2699, 0.1275, 0.2083, 0.1889, 0.1061)T x2 φ x4 φ x5 φ x3 φ x 6 φ x1 0.0525 0.6434 0.1837 
EM (0.1038, 0.2780, 0.1262, 0.2017, 0.1949, 0.0953)T x2 φ x4 φ x5 φ x3 φ x1 φ x 6 0.054 0.9349 0.2213 
LSM (0.1017, 0.3036, 0.1354, 0.1849, 0.1937, 0.0808)T x2 φ x5 φ x4 φ x3 φ x1 φ x 6 0.0607 1.2774 0.2573 
LLSM (0.0965, 0.2682, 0.1288, 0.2166, 0.1901, 0.0998)T x2 φ x4 φ x5 φ x3 φ x 6 φ x1 0.0519 0.6994 0.1916 
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Example 3. Given a decision problem with six alternatives ix  ( 1,2, ,6i   ), the 465 
DM provides his/her preferences over the six decision alternatives, as an incomplete 466 
reciprocal preference relation (adapted from [38]) 467 
0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4
0.4 0.5 0.3 0.6
0.7 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.8
0.7 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.7
0.7 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.5
C
           
 468 
This incomplete reciprocal preference relation was investigated by Xu et al. [38], in 469 
which the optimal priority vector is derived by LLSM as (0.0878,0.1599,W  470 
0.1551,0.2464,0.2208,0.1301)T . This yields a ranking of the six alternatives 471 
4 5 2 3 6 1x x x x x x     . We now examine the problem using CSM as follows. 472 
According to Theorem 1, we know that C can be completed. Without loss of 473 
generality, we set the original weight vector as (0) (1/ 6,1/ 6,1/ 6,1/ 6,1/ 6,1/ 6)TW  . 474 
When   is set to 310 , the values of W, F(W), FCR and ranking of alternatives will 475 
stabilize and remain unchanged. At L=55, one has F(W)=0.5860, -51| |=1.1863 10  476 
 , 2| |=0  , -53| |=1.2503 10   , 4| |= -59.6445 10   , -55| |=2.9292 10   , 477 
-5
6| |=4.2788 10   , FCR=0.0728, (0.0884,0.1615,0.1581,0.2365,0.2185,W    478 
0.1370)T , implying a ranking of these six alternatives as: 4 5x x 2 3 6 1x x x x    . 479 
For this single incomplete reciprocal preference relation, it can also be solved by 480 
EM [40], NRAM[32], LSM[17] , LLSM[38] and GPM [41]. The results are shown in 481 
Table 8, from which we can see that CSM achieves the same ranking as EM, NRAM, 482 
LSM and LLSM, 4 5 2 3 6 1x x x x x x     , while GPM yields a slightly different 483 
ranking, 4 5 2 3 6 1x x x x x x     , which fails to discriminate 4x  and 5x , as well 484 
as 1x , 3x  and 6x . Furthermore, both NRAM and GPM lead to unacceptable 485 
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consistency ratio FCR>0.1, and have larger MD and MAD values than other methods. 486 
A further examination reveals that CSM results in the smallest MAD value among 487 
these six methods and outperforms NRAM, GPM and LSM in all the three criteria. 488 
 489 
Example 4. Consider a GDM problem with three DMs providing the following 490 
incomplete reciprocal preference relations iC  ( 1, 2,3i  ) for a set of four alternatives  491 
 1 2 3 4, , ,X x x x x : 492 
1
0.5 0.3 0.5
0.7 0.5 0.6 0.6
0.4 0.5 0.7
0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5
C
       
, 2
0.5 0.2 0.6 0.7
0.8 0.5 0.8
0.4 0.2 0.5 0.8
0.3 0.4 0.5
C
       
, 3
0.5 0.2 0.5 0.6
0.8 0.5 0.7
0.5 0.5 0.8
0.4 0.3 0.2 0.5
C
       
. 493 
Let 1 2 3 1/3h h h    and 0.0001  . After several iterations, 1| |=5.7495 494 
-510  , 52| | 8.8394 10    , 53| | 3.0899 10    , 4| | 1.1102   1610   , 495 
indicating that the derived priority vector has reached an acceptable error level. 496 
Therefore, the optimal priority vector is found to be (0.1954, 0.4386,W  497 
0.2316,0.1344)T . 498 
The comparative result is shown in Table 9. It is clear that CSM preforms the best 499 
in both MD and MAD. CSM obtains the same ranking as LLSM and LSM,  500 
2 3 1 4x x x x   , while GPM yields a slightly different ranking 2 3 1 4x x x x   ,  501 
as it fails to discriminate 1x  and 3x  and underperforms the proposed CSM and the 502 
other two methods in both MD and MAD. 503 
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Table 8. Performance comparisons for Example 3 
Method W* Ranking  FCR MD MAD 
CSM (This article) (0.0884, 0.1615, 0.1581, 0.2365, 0.2185, 0.1370)T x4 φ x5 φ x2φ x3 φ x 6 φ x1 0.0728 0.7487 0.1802 
EM [40] (0.0896, 0.1671, 0.1594, 0.2355, 0.2225, 0.1258)T x4 φ x5 φ x2φ x3 φ x 6 φ x1 0.0729 0.6047 0.1826 
NRAM [32] (0.1204, 0.1681, 0.1648, 0.2000, 0.1931, 0.1537)T x4 φ x5 φ x2φ x3 φ x 6 φ x1 0.1014 1.3993  0.2345 
GPM [41] (0.1091, 0.1636, 0.1091,0.2545, 0.2545, 0.1091)T x4 ≈ x5 φ x2 φ x3≈ x 6 ≈ x1 0.1033 1.7849 0.2999 
LSM [17] (0.0978, 0.1765, 0.1591, 0.2263, 0.2220, 0.1183)T x4 φ x5 φ x2φ x3 φ x 6 φ x1 0.0778 0.6848 0.1987 
LLSM [38] (0.0878, 0.1599, 0.1551, 0.2464, 0.2208, 0.1301)T x4 φ x5 φ x2φ x3 φ x 6 φ x1 0.0719 0.6037 0.1874 
 
Table 9 
Performance comparisons for Example 4 
Methods W* Ranking MD MAD 
CSM(This article) (0.1954, 0.4386, 0.2316, 0.1344)T x2φ x3 φ x1 φ x4 0.7520 0.1672 
LSM[17] (0.1822, 0.4611, 0.2160, 0.1408)T x2φ x3 φ x1 φ x4 0.9909 0.1946 
GPM [41] (0.2000, 0.4667, 0.2000, 0.1333)T x2φ x3 ≈ x1 φ x4 1.0411 0.1999 
LLSM[38] (0.1864,0.4587,0.2274,0.1275)T x2φ x3 φ x1 φ x4 0.8154 0.1825 
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6. Concluding remarks 
This paper proposes a chi-square method to handle decision problems with 
incomplete reciprocal preference relations and develops a convergent iterative 
algorithm to determine a priority vector. An adapted acceptable consistency ratio is 
employed to judge whether an incomplete reciprocal preference relation is acceptably 
consistent. If its consistency is not acceptable, an algorithm is put forward to repair it 
until its consistency reaches Saaty’s suggested threshold. This extended CSM not only 
improves the consistency level but also aims to preserve the initial preference 
information as much as possible.  
Four numerical examples are examined to illustrate how to apply the proposed 
CSM and its effectiveness. Comparative studies with existing methods reveal the 
following features of the proposed CSM: 
(1) In contrast to LSM, GPM and LLSM where DM’s weights are not considered, 
the proposed CSM allows the analyst to assign proper weights to different experts to 
reflect their varying influences in GDM problems. 
(2) By setting 1h =1 and kh =0 for 2, ,k m  , CSM can be conveniently 
applied to derive a priority vector from a single incomplete reciprocal preference 
relation. This implies that the proposed CSM model can be employed to handle both 
group and individual decision problems. 
(3) By setting ij =1, for all ,i j N , CSM can be utilized to derive a priority 
vector from complete reciprocal preference relations. This indicates that it can be 
flexibly used to handle decision problems with both complete and incomplete 
reciprocal preference relations. 
(4) Numerical experiments demonstrate that CSM often outperforms the other 
methods such as EM, GPM, LSM, LLSM, and NRAM in terms of FCR, MD, and 
MAD when handling incomplete reciprocal preference relations. 
(5) As illustrated in Example 2, CSM tends to have better rank preservation 
capability and discrimination power. 
Current research establishes CSM as a viable and effective tool to handle decision 
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problems with incomplete reciprocal preference relations. In reality, DMs may 
provide their preference judgment in different formats of preference relations. As a 
worthy future research topic, it would be interesting to explore how the CSM 
framework can be extended to tackle other types of decision inputs such as incomplete 
intuitionistic fuzzy preference relations [29], incomplete linguistic preference 
relations [8, 25] and related consensus problems [6, 30, 31]. 
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